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Abstract
We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the
nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes
the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transpar-
ent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade matching to study the role of transfers in
matching. A no-trade matching is one in which the availability of transfers do not affect
the outcome.
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1 Introduction
We explore the role of transfers and cardinal utility in matching markets. Economists
regularly use one- and two-sided models, with and without transfers. For example auc-
tions allow for monetary transfers among the agents, while models of marriage, organ
donation and “housing” exchanges do not. There are two-sided matching models of the
labor market without transfers, such as the market for medical interns in the US; and
traditional models of the labor market where salaries, and therefore transfers, are allowed.
We seek to understand how and why transfers matter in markets for discrete goods.
The question is interesting to us as theorists, but it also matters greatly for one of
the most important applications of matching markets. In the market for medical interns
in the US (see Roth (1984a), Roth and Sotomayor (1990), and Roth (2002)), hospitals
match with applicants for internship positions. We always think of this market as one
without transfers, because salaries are fixed first, before the matching is established. So
at the stage in which the parties bargain over who is to be matched to whom, salaries
are already fixed, and thus there are no transfers.
Now, there is a priori no reason for things to be this way. Hospitals and interns
could instead bargain over salaries and employment at the same time. This is arguably
the normal state of affairs in most other labor markets; and it has been specifically
advocated for the medical interns market in the US (see Crawford (2008)). It is therefore
important to understand the impact of disallowing transfers in a matching market. Our
paper is a first step towards understanding this problem.
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In a two-sided matching market—for our purposes, in the Gale-Shapley marriage
market—this impact is important. We consider two canonical models, the marriage
market without transfers (the NTU model) and the marriage market with transfers (the
TU model, also called the assignment game).
There are Pareto efficient, and even stable, matchings in the NTU model that a utili-
tarian social planner would never choose, regardless of how she weights agents’ utilities. A
utilitarian social planner has implicitly access to transfers. The gap between (utilitarian)
efficiency with transfers and without them can be arbitrarily large. From the viewpoint of
the recent literature in computer science on the “price of anarchy” (see e.g. Roughgarden
(2005)), the “price of stability” can be arbitrarily bad, and grow exponentially with the
size of the market (see our Proposition 15).
We present results characterizing Pareto efficiency and the role of transfers in marriage
models. Ex-ante Pareto optimality in the model with transfers is characterized by the
maximization of the weighted utilitarian sum of utilities, while Pareto optimality when
there are no transfers is equivalent to a different maximization problem, one where the
weighted sum of“adjusted”utilities are employed. Each of these problems, in turn, have a
formulation as a system of linear inequalities. The results follow (perhaps unexpectedly)
from Afriat’s theorem in the theory of revealed preferences.
In order to explore the role of transfers, we study a special kind of stable matching: A
no-trade matching in a marriage market is a matching that is not affected by the presence
of transfers. Agents are happy remaining matched as specified by the matching, even if
transfers are available, and even though they do not make use of transfers. Transfers are
available, but they are not needed to support the stable matching. There is thus a clear
sense in which transfers play no role in a no-trade matching.
The notion of no-trade matching is useful for the following reason. We can think of
transfers as making some agents better off at the expense of others. It is then possible to
modify a market by choosing a cardinal utility representation of agents preferences with
the property that the matching remains stable with and without transfers (Theorem 11).
Under certain circumstances, namely when the stable matchings are “isolated,” we can
choose a cardinal representation that will work in this way for every stable matching. So
under such a cardinal representation of preferences, any stable matching remains stable
regardless of the presence of transfers. Finally (Example 13), we cannot replicate the role
of transfers by re-weighting agents’ utilities. In general, to instate a no-trade matching,
we need the full freedom of choosing alternative cardinal representations.
It is easy to generate examples of stable matchings that cannot be sustained when
transfers are allowed, and of stable matchings that can be sustained with transfers (in
the sense of being utilitarian-efficient), but where transfers are actually used to sustain
stability. We present conditions under which a market has a cardinal utility representation
for which stable matchings are no trade matchings.
In sum, the notion of a no-trade matching captures both TU and NTU stability: a
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no-trade stable matching is also a TU and NTU stable matching. TU stability is, on
the other hand, strictly stronger than ex-ante Pareto efficiency, which is strictly stronger
than ex-post Pareto efficiency. NTU stability is strictly stronger than ex-post Pareto
efficiency.1
The model without transfers was introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). The model
with transfers is due to Shapley and Shubik (1971). Kelso and Crawford (1982) extended
the models further, and in some sense Kelso and Crawford’s is the first paper to investigate
the effects of adding transfers to the Gale-Shapley marriage model. Roth (1984b) and
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) extended the model to allow for more complicated contracts,
not only transfers (see Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Echenique (2012) for a discussion
of the added generality of contracts). We are apparently the first to consider the effect
of transfers on a given market, with specified cardinal utilities, and the first to study the
notion of a no-trade matching.
2 The Marriage Problem
2.1 The model
Let M and W be finite and disjoint sets of, respectively men and women; M∪W comprise
the agents in our model. We can formalize the marriage “market” of M and W in two
ways, depending on whether we assume that agents preferences have cardinal content,
or that they are purely ordinal. For our results, it will be crucial to keep in mind the
difference between the two frameworks.
An ordinal marriage market is a tuple (M,W,P ), where P is a profile: a list of
preferences >i for every man i and >j for every woman j. Each >i is a linear order over
W ∪∅, and each >j is a linear order over M∪∅. Here, ∅ represents the alternative of being
unmatched. The weak order associated with >s is denoted by ≥s for any s ∈M ∪W .2
We often specify a preference profile by describing instead utility functions for all the
agents. A cardinal marriage market is a tuple (M,W,U, V ), where U and V define the
agents’ utility functions: U (i, j) (resp. V (i, j)) is the amount utility derived by man i
(resp. woman j) out of his match with woman j (resp. man i). The utility functions U
and V represent P if, for any i
U(i, j) > U(i, j′) ⇐⇒ j >i j′
and for any j
V (i, j) > V (i′, j) ⇐⇒ i >j i′.
1TU and NTU stability are not comparable in this sense. Empirically, though, they are comparable,
with TU stability having strictly more testable implications than NTU stability (Echenique, Lee, Shum,
and Yenmez, 2013).
2A linear order is a binary relation that is complete, transitive and antisymmetric.
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We say that U and V are a cardinal representation of P . Clearly, for any cardinal
marriage market (M,W,U, V ) there is a corresponding ordinal market.
A one-to-one function σ : M → W is called a matching. When w = σ(m) we say
that m and w are matched, or married, under σ. In our setting, under a given matching,
each man or woman is married to one and only one partner of the opposite sex. We
shall denote by A the set of matchings. We shall assume that M and W have the same
number of elements, so that A is non-empty.
Implicit in our definition of matching is that agents are always married: We do not
allow for the possibility of singles. The assumption of no-singles is done for economy of
exposition, and we do not believe that our results depend on it.3
Under our assumptions, we can write M = {m1, . . . ,mn} and W = {w1, . . . , wn}.
For notational convenience, we often identify mi and wj with the numbers i and j,
respectively. So when we write j = σ(i) we mean that woman wj and man mi are
matched under σ.
We shall often fix an arbitrary matching, and without loss of generality let this match-
ing be the identity matching, denoted by σ0. That is,
σ0 (i) = i.
For a matching σ, let uσ(i) = U(i, σ(i)) and vσ(j) = V (σ(j), j). When σ = σ0, we
shall often omit it as a subscript and just use the notation u and v.
One final concept relates to random matchings. We consider the possibility that
matching is chosen according to a lottery: a fractional matching is a matrix pi = (pii,j)
such that piij ≥ 0 and letting piij the probability that individuals i and j get matched,
the constraints on pi are
1 =
n∑
i=1
piij =
n∑
j=1
piij,
(i.e. pi is a bistochastic matrix ). It is a celebrated result (the Birkhoff von-Neumann
Theorem) that such matrices result from a lottery over matchings. Let B denote the set
of all fractional matchings.
2.2 Classical solution concepts
We describe here classical solution concepts. The first solutions capture the notion of
Pareto efficiency. In a second place we turn to notion of core stability for matching
3Because agents have to match in this model, our model does not account for an outside option in
the agents’ preferences. If we were to introduce singles, then we would need to describe how agents value
the option of remaining single.
4
markets. For simplicity of exposition, we write these definitions for the specific matching
σ0. Of course by relabeling we can express the same definitions for an arbitrary matching.
A solution concept singles out certain matchings as immune to certain alternative
outcomes that could be better for the agents. If we view such alternatives as arising
ex-post, after any uncertainty over which matching arises has been resolved, then we
obtain a different solution concept than if we view the alternatives in an ex-ante sense.
2.2.1 NTU Pareto efficiency
Matching σ0 (i) = i is ex-post NTU Pareto efficient if there is no matching σ that is at
least as good as σ0 for all agents, and strictly better for some agents. That is, such that
the inequalities U (i, σ (i)) ≥ U (i, i) and V (σ−1 (j) , j) ≥ V (j, j) simultaneously hold
with at least one strict inequality.
In considering alternative matchings, it is easy to see that one can restrict oneself
to cycles. The resulting formulation of efficiency is very useful, as it allows us to relate
efficiency with standard notions in the literature on revealed preference.
Hence matching σ0 (i) = i is ex-post Pareto efficient if and only if for every cycle
i1, ..., ip+1 = i1, inequalities U (ik, ik+1) ≥ U (ik, ik) and V (ik, ik+1) ≥ V (ik, ik) cannot
hold simultaneously unless they all are equalities. In other words:
Observation 1 Matching σ0 (i) = i is ex-post NTU Pareto efficient if for every cycle
i1, ..., ip+1 = i1, and for all k, inequalities
U (ik, ik+1) ≥ U (ik, ik) and V (ik, ik+1) ≥ V (ik+1, ik+1) ,
cannot hold simultaneously unless they are all equalities.
In an ex-ante setting, we can think of probabilistic alternatives to σ0. As a result,
we obtain the notion of ex-ante Pareto efficiency. For matching σ0 (i) = i to be ex-ante
Pareto efficient, we require not only that there is no other matching which is preferred
by every individuals, but also that there is no lottery over matchings that would be
preferred.
Formally: Matching σ0 (i) = i is ex-ante NTU Pareto efficient if for any pi ∈ B, and
for all i and j, inequalities∑
j
piijU (i, j) ≥ U (i, i) and
∑
i
piijV (i, j) ≥ V (j, j)
cannot hold simultaneously unless they are all equalities.
Note that the problem of ex-post efficiency is purely ordinal, as ex-post efficiency of
some outcome only depends on the rank order preferences, not on the particular cardinal
representation of it. In contrast, the problem of ex-ante efficiency is cardinal, as we are
adding and comparing utility levels across states of the world.
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2.2.2 TU Pareto efficiency
We now assume that utility is transferable across individuals. In this case, a matching
is Pareto efficient if no other matching produces a higher welfare, accounted as the sum
of individual cardinal utilities. It is a direct consequence of the Birkhoff-von Neumann
theorem that if a fractional matching produces a higher welfare, then some deterministic
matching also produces a higher welfare. As a result, the notions of ex-ante and ex-post
TU Pareto efficiency coincide, and we do not need to distinguish between them.
Matching σ0 (i) = i is TU Pareto efficient if there is no matching σ for which
n∑
i=1
U(i, σ(i)) + V (i, σ(i)) <
n∑
i=1
U(i, i) + V (i, i).
Observation 2 Matching σ0 (i) = i is TU Pareto efficient if for every cycle i1, ..., ip+1 =
i1, and for all k, inequalities
p∑
k=1
U (ik, ik+1) + V (ik, ik+1) ≥
p∑
k=1
U (ik, ik) + V (ik+1, ik+1)
cannot hold simultaneously unless they are all equalities.
In the previous definitions, transfers are allowed across any individuals. One may have
considered the possibility of transfers only between matched individuals. It is however
well known since Shapley and Shubik (1971) that this apparently more restrictive setting
leads in fact to the same notion of efficiency.
2.2.3 NTU Stability
In a second place, we review notions of stability. Instead of focusing on the existence of a
matching which would be improving for everyone (as in Pareto efficiency), we focus on a
matching which would be improving for a newly matched pair of man and woman. Thus
we obtain two solution concepts, depending on whether we allow for transferable utility.
Our definitions are classical and trace back to Gale and Shapley (1962) and Shapley
and Shubik (1971). See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for an exposition of the relevant
theory.
Matching σ0 (i) = i is stable in the nontransferable utility matching market, or NTU
stable if there is no “blocking pair” (i, j), i.e. pair (i, j) such that U (i, j) > U (i, i) and
V (i, j) > V (j, j) simultaneously hold.
Hence, using our assumptions on utility, we obtain the following:
Definition 3 Matching σ0 (i) = i is NTU stable if
∀i, j : min (U (i, j)− U (i, i) , V (i, j)− V (j, j)) ≤ 0.
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Of course, this notion is an ordinal notion and should not depend on the cardinal
representation of men and women’s preferences, only on the underlying ordinal matching
market.
2.2.4 TU Stability
Utility is transferable across pair (i, j) if there is the possibility of a utility transfer t (of
either sign) from j to i such that the utility of i becomes U (i, j) + t, and utility of j
becomes V (i, j) − t. When we assume that utility is transferable, in contrast, we must
allow blocking pairs to use transfers. Then a couple (i, j) can share, using transfers, the
“surplus” U(i, j) + V (i, j). Thus we obtain the definition:
Definition 4 Matching σ0 (i) = i is TU stable, if there are vectors u (i) and v (j) such
that for each i and j,
u (i) + v (j) ≥ U (i, j) + V (i, j)
with equality for i = j.
By a celebrated result of Shapley and Shubik (1971), this notion is equivalent to the
notion of TU Pareto efficiency.
2.3 No-Trade stability
The notions of TU and NTU stability have been known and studied for a very long
time. Here, we seek to better understand the effect that the possibility of transfers has
on a matching market. We introduce a solution concept that is meant to relate the two
notions.
Note that if matching σ0 (i) = i is TU stable, then there are transfers between the
matched partners, say from woman i to man i, equal to
Ti = u (i)− U (i, i) = V (i, i)− v (i)
where the payoffs u (i) and v (j) are those of Definition 4. We want to understand the
situations when matching σ0 (i) = i is TU stable but when no actual transfers are made
at equilibrium. That is not only that agents do not make use of transfers (Ti = 0) but
also that matching σ0 is NTU stable as well as it is TU stable.
We motivate the notion of a No-Trade matching with an example. We present a
matching market with a matching which is both the unique TU stable matching and also
the unique NTU stable matching. In order for agents to accept it, however, transfers are
needed.
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Example 5 Consider the following utilities
U =
 0 2 11 2 0
1 0 2
 , V =
 2 1 01 2 0
0 1 2

Note that the matching σ0(i) = i is the unique NTU stable matching, and is also the
unique TU stable matching. To sustain it in the TU game, however, requires transfers.
Indeed, u(i1) = 0 and v(j2) = 2 cannot be TU stable payoffs as
2 = u(i1) + v(j2) < U(i1, j2) + V (i1, j2) = 3
contradicts Definition 4. Intuitively, one needs to compensate agent i = 1 in order to
remained matched with j = 1. Hence, even though σ0 is NTU-stable and TU-stable,
transfers among the agents are required to sustain it as TU-stable. Anticipating on the
definition to follow, this means this matching is not a No-trade matching.
Matching σ0 (i) = i is no-trade stable when it is TU stable and there are no actual
transfers between partners at equilibrium. In other words, (3.3) should hold with Ti = 0.
That is, U (i, i) = u (i), V (j, j) = v (j), and so:
Definition 6 (No-Trade Matching) Matching σ0 (i) = i is no-trade stable if and only
if for all i and j,
U (i, j) + V (i, j) ≤ U (i, i) + V (j, j) .
Therefore in a no-trade stable matching, two matched individuals would have the
opportunity to operate monetary transfers, but they choose not to do so. To put this
in different terms, in a no-trade stable matching, spouses are “uncorrupted” because no
monetary transfer actually takes place between them, but they are not “incorruptible”,
because the rules of the game would allow for it.
3 Cardinal characterizations
We now present a simple characterization of the solution concepts described in Section 2.2.
Our characterizations involve cardinal notions, even for the solutions that are purely
ordinal in nature. The point is to characterize all solutions using similar concepts, so it
is easier to understand how the solutions differ. It will also help us understand the role
of transfers in matching markets.
We need to introduce the following notation:
Rij = U (i, i)− U (i, j)
Sij = V (j, j)− V (i, j) ,
defined for each i ∈ M and j ∈ W . Note that Rij measures how much i prefers his
current partner to j, and Sij measures how much j prefers her current partner to i.
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Theorem 7 (i) Matching σ0 (i) = i is:
(a) No-trade stable iff
0 ≤ Rij + Sij (3.1)
(b) NTU stable iff for all i and j
0 ≤ max (Rij, Sij) (3.2)
(c) TU stable iff there exists (Ti)i such that for all i and j
Tj − Ti ≤ Rij + Sij (3.3)
(d) Ex-ante Pareto efficient iff there exist vi and λi, µj > 0 such that
vj − vi ≤ λiRij + µjSij (3.4)
(e) Ex-post Pareto iff there exist vi and λi > 0 such that
vj − vi ≤ λi max (Rij, Sij) (3.5)
(ii) In particular:
– No-trade Stable implies TU Stable implies Ex-ante Pareto implies Ex-post Pareto
– No-trade Stable implies NTU stable implies Ex-post Pareto
(iii) But any implication that does not logically follow from the ones above is false.
The implications in part (ii) of this theorem are illustrated in Figure (1).
Example 8 Consider
U =
(
0 −2
1 0
)
and V =
(
0 −2
1 0
)
(3.6)
Then σ0 is TU stable, but not NTU stable, and not No-trade stable.
Example 9 Consider
U =
(
0 2
−1 0
)
and V =
(
0 −1
2 0
)
(3.7)
Then σ0 is NTU stable, and Ex-post Pareto. But it is not TU stable, not Ex-ante
Pareto efficient, and not No-trade stable. To see that σ0 is not Ex-ante Pareto efficient,
consider a lottery which puts equal 50% probability on σ0 and on σ1. Under this lottery,
both agents achieve expected utility 1/2 out of this lottery (instead of 0 under σ0). It
follows from (3.1) that it is also not No-trade stable.
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Figure 1: Summary of (ii) in Theorem 7.
Example 10 Consider now
U =
(
0 1
−2 0
)
and V =
(
0 1
3 0
)
(3.8)
Then σ0 is ex-ante Pareto efficient, and it is ex-post Pareto efficient, but it is not TU
stable, and it is not NTU stable. Ex-ante Pareto efficiency follows from λi = 5, µj = 1
and v2 = 2, v1 = 1. Ex-post Pareto efficiency is clear. It is easily seen that σ0 is not
TU stable. It is also clear that the matching is not NTU stable, as i = 1, j = 2 form a
blocking pair.
4 NTU Stability and No-trade matchings
As we explained above, we use no-trade stability to shed light on the role of transfers.
Given a stable NTU matching, one may ask if is there a cardinal representation of the
agents’ utility such that the stable matching is no-trade stable.
As we shall see, the answer is yes if we are allowed to tailor the cardinal representation
to the given stable matching. If we instead want a representation that works for all stable
matchings in the market, we shall resort to a regularity condition: that the matchings be
isolated.
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Finally, some statements in Theorem 7 involve the rescaling of utilities: they show
how optimality can be understood through the existence of weights on the agents that
satisfy certain properties. We can similarly imagine finding, not an arbitrary cardinal
representation of preferences, but a restricted a rescaling of utilities that captures the
role of transfers. That is to say, a rescaling of utilities that ensures that the matching is
no-trade stable. We shall present an example to the effect that such a rescaling is not
possible.
4.1 Linking models with and without transfers
Our first question is whether for a given NTU stable matching, there is a cardinal repre-
sentation of preferences under which the same matching is No-trade stable. The answer
is yes.
Theorem 11 Let (M,W,P ) be an ordinal matching market. If σ is a stable matching,
then there is a cardinal representation of P such that σ is a no-trade matching in the
corresponding cardinal market.
It is natural to try to strengthen this result in two directions. First, we could ex-
pect to choose the cardinal representation of preferences as a linear rescaling of a given
cardinal representation of the preferences. Given what we know about optimality being
characterized by choosing appropriate utility weights, it makes sense to ask whether any
stable matching can be obtained as a No-Trade Matching if one only weights agents in
the right way. Namely:
Problem 12 Is it the case that matching σ0 = Id is NTU stable if and only if there is
λi, µj > 0 such that
0 ≤ λiRij + µjSij?
After all, transfers favor some agents over others, and utility weights play a similar
role. Our next example shows that this is impossible. It exhibits a stable matching that
is not No-Trade for any choice of utility weights.
Example 13 Consider a marriage market defined as follows. The sets of men and
women are: M = {m1,m2,m3,m4} and W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}. Agents’ preferences are
defined through the following utility functions:
U =

1.01 0 1/2 −1
0 1 −1 1/2
1/2 1/5 1/3 1/4
1/5 1/2 1/3 1/4
 , V =

0 1 1/2 −1
1 0 −1 1/2
1/2 1/5 1/3 1/4
1/5 1/2 1/3 1/4

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The unique stable matching is underlined. Uniqueness is readily verified by running
the Gale-Shapley algorithm. So ui = vj = 1/2 for all i and j. Yet it is shown in the
appendix that there are no λi, µj > 0 such that for all (i, j),
λi(ui − Uij) + µj(vj − Vij) ≥ 0.
Example 13 has the following implication (which also follows from Example 5).
Corollary 1 There are cardinal matching markets that do not possess a no-trade match-
ings.
Given Example 13, it is clear that No-Trade can only be achieved by appropriate
choice of agents’ utility functions. Our next question deals with the existence of cardinal
utilities such that the set of No-trade matchings and NTU stable matchings will coincide
for all stable matchings in a market.
We show that if the stable markets are isolated (a notion defined below) then one can
choose cardinal utilities such that all stable matchings are No-Trade. A stable matching
µ is isolated if µ′(a) 6= µ(a) for all a ∈M ∪W and µ′ ∈ S(P ) \ {µ}.
Theorem 14 There is a representation (U, V ) of P such that for all µ ∈ S(P ), if µ is
isolated then µ is no trade stable for (U, V ).
The question whether the conclusion holds without the assumption that the matching
is isolated remains open to investigation.
4.2 Price of Anarchy
The logic of the previous subsection can be pushed further, to obtain a “Price of An-
archy,” in the spirit of the recent literature in computer science (Roughgarden (2005)).
We quantify the cost in social surplus (sum of agents’ utilities) that results from NTU
stability: we can think of this cost as an efficiency gap inherent in the notion of stable
matching. The result is that the gap can be arbitrarily large, and that it grows “super
exponentially” in the size of the market (i.e. it grows at a faster rate than ng, for any g,
where n is the size of the market).
Let ∆ denote the subset of the simplex in R2n in which every component is at least
: ∆ = {((α(i))i∈M , (β(j))j∈W ) : ∀i ∈ Mα(i) ≥ ,∀j ∈ W,β(j) ≥ }. Let S(M,W,U, V )
denote the set of stable matchings in the cardinal matching market (M,W,U, V ). In the
statement of the results below, we write the matchings in S(M,W,U, V ) as fractional
matchings pi in which every entry in pi is either 0 or 1.
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Proposition 15 For every  > 0, n, g, and K > 0 There is a cardinal marriage market
(M,W,U, V ), with n men and women, and where utilities U and V are bounded by K
such that
min(α,β)∈∆
{
maxpi∈Π
∑n
i=1 α(i)
∑n
j′=1 pii,j′U(i, j
′)
+
∑n
j=1 β(j)
∑n
i′=1 pii′,j′V (i
′, j)
}
max(α,β)∈∆
{
maxpi∈S(M,W,U,V )
∑n
i=1 α(i)
∑n
j′=1 pii,j′U(i, j
′)
+
∑n
j=1 β(j)
∑n
i′=1 pii′,jV (i
′, j)
} is Ω(ngK)
Proposition 15 shows that the gap in the sum of utilities, between the maximizing
(probabilistic) matchings, and the stable matchings, is large and grows with the size of
the market at a rate that is arbitrarily large. Moreover, the gap is large regardless of
how one weighs agents’ utilities.
Of course, the interpretation of Proposition 15 is not completely straightforward. It
does not seem right to compare the sum of utilities in a model in which transfers are
not allowed with the sum of utilities in the TU model.4 Nevertheless, we hope that
Proposition 15 sheds additional light on the role of transfers in matching markets.
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Appendix A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. (i) (a) Characterization (3.2) follows directly from the definition.
(b) For characterization of TU stability in terms of (3.3), recall that according to the
definition, matching σ0 (i) = i is TU Stable if there are vectors u (i) and v (j) such that
for each i and j,
u (i) + v (j) ≥ U (i, j) + V (i, j)
with equality for i = j. Hence, there exists a monetary transfer Ti (of either sign) from
man i to woman i at equilibrium given by
Ti = u (i)− U (i, i) = V (i, i)− v (i) .
The stability condition rewrites as Tj−Ti ≤ Rij +Sij, thus, one is led to characterization
(3.3).
(c) For characterization of Ex-post Pareto efficient matchings in terms of (3.5), assume
σ0 is Ex-post Pareto efficient, and let
Qij = max (Rij, Sij) ,
so that by definition, matrixQij satisfies“cyclical consistency”: for any cycle i1, ..., ip+1 =
i1,
∀k, Qikik+1 ≤ 0 implies ∀k, Qikik+1 = 0, (A.1)
By the Linear Programming proof of Afriat’s theorem in Fostel, Scarf, and Todd (2004)5,
see implication (i) implies (ii) in Ekeland and Galichon (2012), there are scalars λi > 0
and vi such that (3.5) holds.
(d) For characterization of Ex-ante Pareto efficient matchings in terms of (3.4), the
proof is an extension of the proof by Fostel, Scarf, and Todd (2004), which give in full.
Assume σ0 is Ex-ante efficient. Then the Linear Programming problem
max
∑
i
xi +
∑
j
yj
s.t.
xi = −
∑
j
piijRij and yj = −
∑
i
piijSij∑
k
piik =
∑
k
piki and
∑
k
piik = 1
xi ≥ 0, yj ≥ 0, piij ≥ 0.
5The link between Afriat’s theorem and the characterization of efficiency in the housing problem was
first made in Ekeland and Galichon (2012).
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is feasible and its value is zero. Thus it coincides with the value of its dual, which is
min−
∑
i
φi
s.t.
vj − vi ≤ λiRij + µjSij + φi
λi ≥ 1 and µj ≥ 1
where variables λi, µj, vi and φi in the dual problem are the Lagrange multipliers asso-
ciated to the four constraints in the primal problem, and variables piij, xi, and yj in the
primal problem are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the three constraints in the
dual problem. Hence the dual program is feasible, and there exist vectors λ, µ, and φ,
such that
vj − vi ≤ λiRij + µjSij + φi (A.2)
λi ≥ 1 and µj ≥ 1∑
i
φi = 0
but setting j = i in inequality (A.2) implies (because Rii = Sii = 0) that φi ≥ 0, hence
as
∑
i φi = 0, thus φi = 0. Therefore it exist vectors λi > 0 and µj > 0, such that
vj − vi ≤ λiRij + µjSij
QED.
(e) Characterization of No-trade stable matchings as in (3.1) follows directly from the
definition.
(ii) No trade stable implies TU Stable is obtained by taking with Ti = 0 in (3.3).
TU Stable implies Ex-ante Pareto is obtained by taking vi = Ti and λi = µj = 1 in
(3.4).
To show that Ex-ante Pareto implies Ex-post Pareto, assume there exist vi and
λi, µj > 0 such that vj − vi ≤ λiRij + µjSij. Now assume max (Rij, Sij) ≤ 0. Then
vj − vi ≤ 0, and the same implication holds with strict inequalities. By implication
(iii) implies (ii) in Ekeland and Galichon (2012), there exist scalars v′i and λ
′
i such that
v′j − v′i ≤ λ′i max (Rij, Sij).
No-trade stable implies NTU stable follows from Rij + Sij ≤ 2 max (Rij, Sij).
NTU Stable implies Ex-post Pareto is obtained by taking λi = 1 and vi = 0 in (3.5).
In order to show point (iii), we need to show the following claims, proved in Examples
8 to 10:
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• TU Stable does not imply NTU Stable – cf. example 8
• NTU Stable does not imply Ex-Ante Pareto – cf. example 9
• Ex-ante Pareto does not imply TU Stable – cf. example 10
• Ex-ante Pareto does not imply NTU Stable – cf. example 10
• Ex-post Pareto does not imply ex-ante Pareto – cf. example 9
• Ex-post Pareto does not imply NTU stable – cf. example 10
• NTU stable does not imply No Trade stable – cf. example 9
• TU stable does not imply No Trade stable – cf. example 8.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 15
Let n be an even positive number. Let (M,W,U, V ) be a marriage market with n men and
n women, defined as follows. The agents ordinal preferences are defined in the following
tables:
i1 i2 i3 · · · in−2 in−1 in
j1 j2 j3 · · · jn−2 jn−1 jn−1
j2 j3 j4 · · · jn−1 j1 j1
j3 j4 j5 · · · jn−2 j1 j2
...
jn/2 jn/2+1 jn/2+1 · · · jn/2−2 jn/2−1 jn/2−1
jn
...
jn−1 jn j1 · · ·
jn j1 j2 · · · jn−3 jn−2
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The table means that j1 is the most preferred partner for i1, followed by j2, and so on.
The women’s’ preferences are as follows.
j1 j2 j3 · · · jn−2 jn−1 jn
i2 i3 i4 · · · in−1 i1 i1
i3 i4 i5 · · · in−1 i2 i2
...
in/2 in/2+1 in/2+2 · · · in/2−2 in/2−1 in/2−1
in/2+1 in/2+2 in/2+3 · · · in/2 in/2
...
in−1 in i1 · · · in−4 in−3
in i1 i2 · · · in−3 in−1
i1 i2 i3 · · · in−2 in
i1 i2 i3 · · · in−2 in−1 in
It is a routine matter to verify that there is a unique stable matching in this market.
It has i1 matched to jn/2, i2 matched to jn/2+1, and so on, until we obtain that in−1
is matched to jn/2−1. We have in matched to jn. (The logic of this example is that
in creates cycles in the man-proposing algorithm which pushes the men down in their
proposals until reaching the matching in the “middle” of their preferences; jn plays the
same role in the woman proposing version of the algorithm).
Define agents’ cardinal preferences as follows. Let
U(i, j) = [n− rm(w)] 1
ng
+ max{0, n− 1− ri(j)}(K − n− 1
ng
),
where ri(j) is the rank of woman j in i’ preferences. Similarly define V (i, j), replacing
ri(j) with rj(i). Then, given the preferences defined above, the agents utilities at the
unique stable matching satisfy:
u(il) = v(jl) =
1
2ng−1
, l = 1, . . . , n− 1 and u(in) = v(jn) = (n/2− 1) 1
ng
.
So that the sum of all agents utilities at the unique stable matching is:
2(n− 1)( 1
2ng−1
) + 2(n/2− 1) 1
ng
,
and agents’ weighted sum of utilities is at most
max{ 1
2ng−1
, (n/2− 1) 1
ng
}.
Consider the matchings µ∗(il) = jl, l = 1, . . . , n, and µˆ(j1) = i2, . . . µˆ(jn−2) = in−1,
µˆ(jn−1) = i1, µˆ(jn) = in. Let pi be the random matching that results from choosing µ∗
and µˆ with equal probability. Then, for all i 6= in and j 6= jn we have that∑
j′
pii,j′U(i, j
′) =
∑
i′
pij,i′V (i
′, j) = K/2,
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while ∑
j′
pii,j′U(in, j
′) =
∑
i′
pij,i′V (i
′, jn) = (n/2− 1) 1
n3
.
Then ∑
i∈M
α(i)
∑
j′∈W
pii,j′U(i, j
′) +
∑
j∈W
β(j)
∑
i′∈M
pij,i′V (i
′, j) ≥ nK/2.
So, regardless of the values of α and β in ∆, the fraction∑
i∈M α(i)
∑
j′∈W pii,j′U(i, j
′) +
∑
j∈W β(j)
∑
i′∈M pij,i′V (i
′, j)∑
i∈M α(i)u(i) +
∑
j∈W β(j)v(j)
is bounded below by
nK/2
max{ 1
2ng−1 , (n/2− 1) 1ng }
,
which is Ω(Kng).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 11
Assume µ0 (i) = i (this is w.l.o.g. as can always relabel individuals). Take Rij =
U (i, j) − U (i, i) and Sij = V (i, j) − V (j, j). µ0 is Stable iff min (Rij, Sij) ≤ 0 for all i
and j, with strict inequality for j 6= i.
One has for i 6= j, as t→∞
1
t
log
(
e−tRij + e−tSij
)→ min (Rij, Sij)
hence for t large enough and i 6= j,
−1
t
log
(
e−tRij + e−tSij
)
< 0
that is
e−tRij + e−tSij > 1.
Take
t > max
i 6=j
(∣∣∣∣ log 2Rij
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣ log 2Sij
∣∣∣∣)
and consider
U¯ (i, j) =
1
2
− e−tRij for i 6= j
U¯ (i, i) = 0
one has:
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• U¯ (i, j) > 0 if and only if 1
2
> e−tRij that is − log 2 > −tRij that is tRij > log 2
hence Rij > 0.
• U¯ (i, j) < 0 if and only if tRij < log 2 hence Rij < 0.
With a similar construction for V¯ (i, j), one has
U¯ (i, j) + V¯ (i, j) ≤ 0 = U¯ (i, i) + V¯ (j, j) .
Thus µ0 is a No-Trade Matching associated to utilities U¯ and V¯ .
A.4 Claim in Example 13
The problem is to find x 0 such that A · x ≥ 0. We introduce the matrix B such that
the i’th row of B is the vector ei = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) with a 1 only in entry i. Then we
want to find a vector x ∈ Rn such that A · x ≥ 0 and B · x 0. By Motzkin’s Theorem
of the Alternative, such a vector x exists iff there is no (y, z), with z > 0 (meaning z ≥ 0
and z 6= 0) such that
y · A+ z ·B = 0.
i i′ i0 i1
j j′ j w′
j0 j1 j0 j0
j′ j j1 j1
j1 j0 j
′ j
j j′ j0 j1
i′ i i i
′
i0 i1 i0 i0
i i′ i1 i1
i1 i0 i
′ i
Utilities are:
i i′ i0 i1
1 + δ 1 1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3
0 0 1/4 1/4
−1 −1 1/5 1/5
j j′ j0 j1
1 1 1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3
0 0 1/4 1/4
−1 −1 1/5 1/5
The upper 4 rows of A are:
i i′ i0 i1 j j′ j0 j1
i, j 1/2− (1 + δ) 0 0 0 1/2 0 0 0
i, j′ 1/2 0 0 0 0 1/2− 1
i′, j 0 1/2 0 0 −1/2 0 0 0
i′, j′ 0 −1/2 0 0 0 1/2 0 0
So the sum of the first four rows of A is (−δ, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
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Notice that we have other rows: for example the row corresponding to (i, j1) is:
i i′ i0 i1 j j′ j0 j1
i, j1 1/2 + 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2− 1/5,
but these rows will get weight zero in the linear combination below.
So y = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) and z = (δ, 0, . . . , 0) exhibit a solution to the alternative
system as
y · A+ z ·B = (−δ, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) + δ(1, 0, . . . , 0) = 0
A.5 Proof of Theorem 14.
Let S(P ) be the set of stable matchings in the ordinal matching market (M,W,P ). Sup-
pose that there are N stable matchings, and enumerate them, so S(P ) = {µ1, . . . , µK}.
To prove the proposition we first establish some simple lemmas.
Lemma 2 For any i ∈M and j ∈ W ,∣∣{k : j >i µk(i)}∣∣+ ∣∣{k : i >j µk(j)}∣∣ ≤ K − ∣∣{k : j = µk(i)}∣∣
Proof. Let j >i µ
k(i); then for µk to be stable we need that µk(j) >j i. So
∣∣{k : j >i µk(i)}∣∣ ≤∣∣{k : µk(j)>j i}∣∣.
Then, ∣∣{k : i >j µk(j)}∣∣ = K − ∣∣{k : µk(j)≥j i}∣∣
≤ K − ∣∣{k : j >i µk(i)}∣∣− ∣∣{k : j = µk(i)}∣∣ ,
where the last inequality follows from the previous paragraph and the fact that preferences
>j are strict.
Let Uˆ(i, j) =
∣∣{k : j ≥i µk(i)}∣∣ and Vˆ (i, j) = ∣∣{k : i >j µk(j)}∣∣. By the previous
lemma, Uˆ(i, j) + Vˆ (i, j) ≤ K for all i and j.
Lemma 3 If µ is an isolated stable matching, and i, iˆ ∈M , then µ(i) >i µ′(i) iff µ(ˆi) >iˆ
µ′(ˆi).
Proof. Suppose (reasoning by contradiction) that µ(i) >i µ
′(i) while µ′(ˆi) ≥iˆ µ(ˆi). Since
µ is isolated and preferences are strict, we have µ′(ˆi) >iˆ µ(ˆi). Now let µˆ = µ ∨ µ′, using
the join operator in the lattice of stable matchings (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990)).
Then µˆ(i) = µ(i) and µˆ(ˆi) = µ′(ˆi). So µˆ ∈ S(P ), µˆ(i) = µ(i), and µˆ 6= µ; a contradiction
of the hypothesis that µ is isolated.
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Lemma 4 If µ is an isolated stable matching then
Uˆ(i, µ(i)) + Vˆ (µ(j), j) = K.
Proof. We prove that
{k : µ 6= µk and µ(i) ≥i µk(i)} = {k : µ 6= µk and µk(j) ≥j µ(j)}.
The lemma follows then because
Uˆ(i, µ(i)) + Vˆ (µ(j), j) =
∣∣{n : µ(i)≥i µk(i)}∣∣+ ∣∣{k : µk(j)>j µ(j)}∣∣
= 1 +
∣∣{k : µ 6= µk and µ(i)≥i µk(i)}∣∣
+ (K − ∣∣{k : µ 6= µk and µk(j)≥j µ(j)}∣∣− 1).
Let µ(i) ≥i µk(i) and let i = µ(j). Since µ 6= µk is isolated and preferences are strict,
µ(i) >i µ
k(i). Then by Lemma 3, µ(i) >i µ
k(i); so j = µ(i) implies that µk(j) >j µ(j).
Similarly, if µk(j) >j µ(j) then µ(i) >i µ
k(i). So µ(i) >i µ
k(i).
We are now in a position to prove the proposition.
Define a representation U and V of P as follows. Fix δ such that 0 < δ < 1/2. Let
U(i, j) = Uˆ(i, j) and V (i, j) = Vˆ (i, j) if there is µ ∈ S(P ) such that j = µ(i). Otherwise,
if j is worse than i’s partner in any stable matching, let U(i, j) < 0 (and chosen to respect
representation of P ); and if there is µ ∈ S(P ) such that j >i µ(i), let µ0 be the best such
matching for i, and choose U(i, j) such that U(i, j)−U(i, µ0(i)) < δ. Choose V similarly.
Let µ be an isolated matching. Fix a pair (i, j) and suppose, wlog that uµ(i)−U(i, j) <
0 and vµ(i) − V (i, j) ≥ 0 (if uµ(i) − U(i, j) ≥ 0 and vµ(i) − V (i, j) ≥ 0 then there is
nothing to prove; and they cannot both be < 0 or (i, j) would constitute a blocking pair).
First, if i and j are matched in some matching µ′ ∈ S(P ) then uµ(i)−U(i, j)+vµ(i)−
V (i, j) = uµ(i)−Uˆ(i, j)+vµ(i)−Vˆ (i, j) so it follows that uµ(i)−U(i, j)+vµ(i)−V (i, j) ≥ 0
by Lemmas 2, 4, and the definition of Uˆ(i, j) and Vˆ (i, j).
Second, let us assume that i and j are not matched in any matching in S(P ). Since
uµ(i)−U(i, j) < 0 we know that there is a matching that is worse for i than j. Let µ0 be
such that j >i µ
′(i) implies that µ0(i) ≥i µ′(i). Thus uµ0(i)− U(i, j) > −δ by definition
of U(i, j). Since j >i µ
0(i), we also have µ0(j) >j i, or µ
0 would not be stable. Then,
letting µ1 be the best matching in S(P ) for j, out of those that are worse than i, we have
vµ0(j) − V (i, j) = vµ0(j) − vµ1(j) + vµ1(j) − V (i, j) > 1 − δ, as µ0(j) >j µ1(j) implies
that vµ0(j)− vµ1(j) ≥ 1 and the definition of V (i, j) implies that vµ1(j)− V (i, j) > −δ.
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Finally,
uµ(i)− U(i, j) + vµ(i)− V (i, j) = uµ(i)− uµ0(i) + uµ0(i)− U(i, j)
+ vµ(i)− vµ0(j) + vµ0(j)− V (i, j)
= (uµ(i)− uµ0(i) + vµ(i)− vµ0(j))
+ (uµ0(i)− U(i, j)) + (vµ0(j)− V (i, j))
≥ 0 + (−δ) + (1− δ) > 0,
where the first inequality follows from the remarks in the previous paragraphs, and from
the fact that K = uµ(i) + vµ(i) ≥ uµ0(i) + vµ0(j) by Lemmas 2 and 4. The second
inequality follows because δ < 1/2. This proves the proposition.
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